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The central elements in President Clinton's proposal to reform the welfare system are: 
increasing the earned income tax credit, improving the child support system, educating and training the
poor, and limiting the amount of time people can receive assistance.  The authors commend the first
two components of the president's plan but question the likely effectiveness of the last two:  even with
the education, training, and child care programs that the president has proposed, few welfare recipients
will be able to command wages that would lift them out of poverty, and successful education and
training programs would cost more than the government appears willing to spend.  They recommend
that the president consider giving tax credits to, and subsidizing the wages paid by, employers who hire
low-wage workers and assist young people and poor families to save for future opportunities.  In their
view, poverty will not be alleviated by only getting tough on welfare recipients; instead, labor market
interventions should be adopted so as to expand opportunities for low-wage, low-skilled workers.The Clinton Welfare Reform Plan: 
Will It End Poverty as We Know It?
In 1973, Henry Aaron posed a deceptively simple question as the title of his Brookings
monograph, Why Is Welfare So Hard to Reform? (Aaron, 1973).  At that time, the Nixon administration
was in its third year of efforts to gain congressional passage of its modified negative income tax (the
"Family Assistance Plan," or FAP, as it was known) designed to replace the nation's welfare system. 
FAP was defeated (albeit narrowly), as were the large-scale welfare reform proposals of every
subsequent president other than George Bush, who had none.  In 1994, the nation is again participating
in this quadrennial event, wrestling with a Clinton administration plan designed to "end welfare as we
know it."  As before, efforts to reform welfare are weighed down by a mind-numbing number of
constraints and tradeoffs, only some of which can be affected by policy.
The unexpected parallel trends in real antipoverty expenditures and the size of the poverty
population over the last twenty years show why presidents want to end welfare.  The antipoverty
strategy we have adopted over the past two decades has failed to reduce the number of people living in
families with incomes below the poverty line.  
Several reasons account for this failure.  First, the budgets for antipoverty programs have never
been large; moreover, real expenditures devoted to some of the most important of them (for example,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children) have declined since 1973.  Second, antipoverty programs
often discourage desirable behavior like working, saving, and taking initiative, all of which contribute
to income growth and an expansion of opportunity.  Third, the system is a bewildering patchwork in
which households in identical economic circumstances can receive widely different levels of support,
based on their state of residence, household structure, and health status.  Finally, there seems to be a
fundamental gap between the basic rationale for those antipoverty programs now on the books and
society's current judgments about the nature and causes of poverty.  2
Against this background, the Clinton administration has prepared a welfare reform package that
has four main themes:  "make work pay," strengthen the nation's system of child support enforcement
and collection, provide education and training to poor people, and place limits on the length of time that
many recipients are able to collect welfare benefits.   These proposals take some steps toward
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addressing the problems of existing antipoverty programs.  At the same time, past experience tells us
that the magnitude of the poverty problem will not be reduced significantly unless budgetary resources
are increased to match the rhetoric accompanying the proposals.  Terminating recipients from access to
income support or enforcing public service employment as a requirement for income support—ending
welfare as we know it—cannot be accomplished without major increases in spending on child care,
health, and education and training, unless the nation is prepared to become more harsh and punitive
toward the poorest among us than it has ever been.
AN OVERVIEW OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY
Table 1 provides an overview of antipoverty programs since 1970.  The years in the table
correspond to peaks in the business cycle (1990 was the business cycle peak, 1989–1992 are included
for completeness).  The first two columns of the table show the number of persons with market
incomes below the poverty line before and after cash transfers in the United States.   In 1960, 39.9
2
million people (22.2 percent of the population) had incomes after cash transfers below the poverty line.  
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By 1970, this number had fallen by 36 percent, to 25.4 million (or 12.6 percent of the population),
because of the economic expansion, demographic changes, increased coverage and generosity of the
Social Security system, and the War on Poverty/Great Society programs.  Since 1973, however, the
poverty population has increased sharply.  The gain from 1979 to 1989 is particularly distressing; the
sustained period of economic growth from 1982 to 1990 failed to raise the economic position of the
poorest among us.  Contrary to earlier experience, this rising tide did not lift3
TABLE 1
Poverty Population and Real Cash and Near-Cash Transfer Program Expenditures, Selected Years
  Number Persons in Percent of
  of Pretax,   Official   Population Benefits as a
 Pretransfer  Poverty in Official  AFDC Food Stamp   SSI  Total      EITC  Percentage
Year Poor (1000s)   (1000s)  Poverty Benefits   Benefits Benefits Benefits Expenditures    of GDP
b b
1970  n.a. 25,420 12.6 $15,051 n.a. $10,627 $25,678 n.a.  0.70
1973 n.a. 22,973 11.1 22,382 $7,186 10,801 33,183 n.a.  0.78
a
1979 42,783 26,072 11.7 19,382 11,184 13,672 44,238 $3,966 0.92
1983 52,700 35,303 15.2 17,975 16,585 13,247 47,807 2,528 1.00
1989 49,052 31,534 12.8 18,120 13,760 16,640 48,520 7,462 0.82
1990 50,851 33,585 13.5 18,529 15,717 17,277 51,523 7,437 0.87
1991 54,679 35,708 14.2 19,319 18,463 18,520 56,302 9,689 0.96
1992 57,350 36,880 14.5 20,431 21,884 21,258 63,573 11,783 1.05
Sources:  U.S. Congress (1993), pp. 678, 867, 1058, 1312–13, 1342, 1609; U.S. Bureau of the Census (1993a), p. xviii;  Council of Economic Advisors (1994), Table
B-1 p. 268, Table B-59 p. 335.
Notes:  Benefits in millions of 1992 dollars.
Includes administrative costs of the program in 1973.
a
Includes state and federal benefits.
b4
all boats, and as a result, the common belief in the antipoverty impacts of good macroeconomic
performance has been shaken.
Columns 4 through 6 show federal expenditures on the largest cash or "near-cash" means-tested
antipoverty programs.  Through these programs, the nation currently spends around 1 percent of GDP
on families and individuals with incomes below the poverty line.  Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), commonly referred to as "welfare," is the largest antipoverty income support
program directed at families with children.   It is jointly funded by states and the federal government
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and is largely administered by the states.  As shown in the table, the real value of aggregate AFDC
benefits peaked around 1973; over the next ten years real AFDC expenditures fell by almost 20 percent,
although the number of persons in families with incomes below the poverty line increased by 54
percent.  Real AFDC expenditures have grown since 1983.
  The decline in AFDC benefits has been more than offset, in the aggregate, by a rapid increase
in expenditures on the food stamp program, the nation's only antipoverty program available to all of the
poor.  The food stamp program provides vouchers, redeemable for food, to any individual or family that
falls below the program's income and asset cutoffs.   Real food stamp expenditures more than doubled
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between 1973 and 1983, thereby compensating for the decline in AFDC.  Since 1983 there has been
modest growth in the combined value of AFDC and food stamps, while the size of the poverty
population has remained roughly constant.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a cash assistance program directed at poor people who
are elderly, blind, or disabled; and like food stamps, it is funded by the federal government and has
uniform nationwide eligibility standards.  SSI has grown fairly steadily since the early 1970s.  
In addition to these cash or near-cash programs, a number of additional federal programs have
significant antipoverty components.  The government spent $75.8 billion in 1993 providing health care
benefits through Medicaid, $21.5 billion on housing benefits through public housing and rent subsidies,5
and $9.5 billion on Head Start and other compensatory education programs.  Moreover, a significant
share of Social Security and veterans' benefits are paid to families and individuals who, in the absence
of these payments, would have incomes below the poverty line.  The earned income tax credit (EITC),
a refundable subsidy to earned income directed primarily toward low-income workers with children, is
a major antipoverty program administered on the tax side of the budget (Scholz, 1994).  By 1996, the
EITC is expected to be the largest cash or near-cash program directed toward low-income families with
children.
This constellation of existing tax and transfer measures contributes importantly to improving
the lives of the nation's most disadvantaged, and to reducing the incidence of measured poverty. 
Indeed, according to the 1993 Green Book (U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, 1993, pp.
1342–1343), the full panoply of cash and noncash transfer programs (including federal income and
payroll taxes) existing in 1991 removed from poverty nearly 23 million of the 55 million pretax and
pretransfer poor; without these programs, the nation would have had a poverty rate of 21.8 percent, but
with them in place the actual poverty rate was 12.6 percent.   Without the programs in place, it would
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have taken over $160 billion (in 1991 dollars) to have closed the poverty gap; with them, the remaining
poverty gap stood at about $52 billion.
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Although this set of tax and transfer measures plays an important role in reducing poverty, not
all is well with this policy mix.  In the following paragraphs, we summarize a number of shortcomings
that afflict this system.
THE EFFICIENCY OF CURRENT TAXES AND TRANSFERS AS ANTIPOVERTY POLICY
If the ultimate test of antipoverty policy is its outcome, our current system of tax and transfer
programs appears to be slipping.  While these programs pulled 48 percent of the nation's pretax and6
pretransfer poor above the poverty line in 1979, they lifted 42 percent of the market-income poor out of
poverty in 1991 (U.S. Congress, 1993, pp. 1342–1343).   
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There are many reasons for this result.  As we pointed out in the previous section, the real value
of those transfers that are the most highly targeted on the poor—AFDC and food stamps—grew at a
slower rate (43.1 percent) than the rate of growth in the number of the official poor since 1973 (60.5
percent).  At the same time, eligibility was tightened for large programs such as the disability portion of
Social Security and Unemployment Insurance. 
There has also been a striking increase in earnings inequality in the nation, beginning in the
1970s, but accelerating over the 1980s (Levy and Murnane, 1992; Haveman and Buron, 1994).  The
figures in Table 2, which show median incomes of men and women by their level of educational
attainment, reflect this increase and show the deterioration at the bottom of the distribution which has
contributed to the growing gap.  In 1973, the median male with 1–3 years of high school had $24,079 in
income (in 1989 dollars); by 1989 the median worker with the same level of education had only
$14,439 in income.  The trend is nearly as dramatic for males with only a high school degree.  In 1973,
the median male had an income of $30,252; this had fallen to $21,650 by 1989.   The erosion of labor
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market opportunities for people with low levels of education has placed an enormous strain on the
nation's antipoverty programs.  
In addition to the erosion in transfer benefits and the deterioration in labor market opportunities
for low-wage workers, the programs themselves have, in all likelihood, contributed to the growth of the
poverty problem.  As suggested above, the programs carry with them a disturbing set of incentives. 
The most prominent of these incentives are the high marginal tax rates placed on the earnings of
households that receive benefits.  Interestingly, this high-tax-rate problem does not lie with the
individual income tax.  As shown in Table 3, except for a brief period in the early 1980s, the
combination of personal exemptions and the standard deduction has been enough to keep almost7
TABLE 2
Median Income of Persons 25 and Over, by Educational Attainment and Gender,
Selected Years, 1989 Dollars
                        Males                                            Females                   
         High School         College        High School         College
Year 1–3 Years 4 Years 4+ Years 1–3 Years 4 Years 4+ Years
1967 $22,858 $26,894 $39,186 $7,574 $10,800 $19,205
1970  23,442 28,034 40,527 7,629 10,866 19,735
1973 24,079 30,252 41,065 7,920 11,087 19,667
1979 18,697 26,416 36,626 6,726 9,085 16,923
1983 15,138 21,932 35,188 6,531 9,326 18,427
1989 14,439 21,650 37,553 6,752 10,439 21,659
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990), for 1967–1983 figures, and U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1991), for 1989 figures.8
TABLE 3
Poverty Line, Tax Threshold, and Marginal Tax Rates for 4-Person and 3-Person Families,
Selected Years
   2 Parents, 2 Kids       1 Parent, 2 Kids    Combined  EITC
Poverty     Tax Poverty     Tax Lowest   Payroll Subsidy
Year   Line Threshold   Line Threshold  MTR     Tax   Rate
a a b
1970 $3,968 $3,600 $3,099 $2,975 14% 9.60% n.a.
1973 4,533 4,300 3,537 3,550 14 11.70 n.a.
1979 7,412 7,400 5,784 5,300 14 12.26 10%
1983 10,178 7,400 7,938 5,300 11 13.40 10
1989 12,675 13,200 9,885 10,550 15 15.02 14
1990 13,359 13,650 10,419 10,900 15 15.30 14
1991 13,924 14,300 10,860 11,400 15 15.30 17.3
c
1992 14,343 15,200 11,187 12,150 15 15.30 18.4
1993 14,772 15,600 11,522 12,500 15 15.30 19.5
Sources:  U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992), pp. 32, 79, 137; U.S. Department of the Treasury
(1993), pp. 22, 71, 130; U.S. Congress (1993), Table 2, p. 1310;  Pechman (1987), Tables A1, A3, and
A11; Internal Revenue Service (1972), pp. 284, 291; Internal Revenue Service (1976), pp. 186, 192.
1970 and 1973 tax threshold assumes the low income allowance standard deduction was taken.
a
The marginal tax rate on income after exemptions and deductions (or zero bracket amount).
b
This rate applies to taxpayers with two or more qualifying children.  The rate is 16.7 percent with one
c
qualifying child.9
all families with market incomes below the poverty line from paying federal income taxes.  In addition,
the subsidy rate in the refundable EITC has offset much of the combined employer and employee share
of the Social Security payroll tax.  Instead, the largest disincentives caused by high marginal tax rates
stem from the benefit reduction rules of the primary income transfer programs.
The AFDC program, for example, allows recipients with earnings to shelter $90 per month for
work expenses, as much as $175 per child per month for child care expenses, and, for the first four
months of work, $30 plus an additional one-third of remaining earnings.  This implies that the marginal
tax rate on income that exceeds work and child care expenses (and the $30 disregard) is 66  percent
for the first four months of work.  After four consecutive months the implicit tax rate increases to 100
percent after work and child care expenses are considered.   In addition, the implicit marginal tax rate
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on countable income (which excludes 20 percent of earned income) from food stamps is 30 percent. 
Therefore, the marginal tax rate for a poor family receiving both AFDC and food stamps is at least 70
percent.   While effective tax rates may be lower than these statutory rates due to noncompliance and
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other factors, estimated effective marginal tax rates are still quite high (see, for example, Fraker,
Moffitt, and Wolf [1985]).  The high marginal tax rates imposed on welfare recipients—lowering the
after-tax wage rate to a small fraction of the before-tax wage, which reflects social productivity—are
only the most prominent of the efficiency distortions caused by the system.
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In addition to placing these high marginal tax rates on earnings, the transfer system makes it
nearly impossible for recipients to legally accumulate the assets necessary to make a wide range of
choices leading to independence—helping a child attend college, acquiring additional training, or
moving away from a dangerous neighborhood.   While asset tests might help target benefits to the
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poorest members of society, they also make it extremely difficult for program recipients to acquire
skills that may help them or their children avoid poverty in the future.  As with high implicit tax rates10
on labor earnings, asset tests distort the economic decisions of low-income households and hence
reduce the efficiency of antipoverty policy.
A third problem with existing policy is that it is a patchwork:  programs are designed to serve
particular categories of people, and each program has a different eligibility standard.  As a result, only
if people fall into particular boxes—are poor, unmarried, and responsible for children; are poor and
blind, or poor and unable to engage in "gainful activity" because of health reasons; or are working at
paid employment, have children, and are the primary worker in the family—are they eligible for
income support.  The categorical nature of the system provides incentives for couples to split up or not
to marry, for women to have children, and, in general, for poor people to adopt behaviors that in the
absence of the program they would not choose.  Whether people respond to these incentives in an
economically significant way is a matter of intense research and debate, but the structure of incentives
is clear.
A categorical antipoverty system will have gaps—cracks in the safety net through which people
will fall.  Perhaps the largest crack is the one through which working poor people fall.  Of all of the
available programs that exist to help poor people, families headed by someone who works full-time or
nearly full-time are eligible for only food stamps and, if they have children, the EITC.   In addition to
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differences in support available to poor working and nonworking people, there are other forms of
horizontal inequity.  Because benefit levels and eligibility standards for major parts of the tax and
transfer system are determined by state governments, equally poor people in different parts of the
country are treated very differently.  For example, in 1992, a mother with two children and with no
earnings would have received a combined AFDC and food stamp benefit of $4,944 per year in
Mississippi; the same mother would have received benefits from these two programs of roughly
$10,000 if she had lived in Vermont or Connecticut (U.S. Congress, 1993, pp. 1251–1253).  In addition11
to creating inequity, such large interstate differentials in benefits provide incentives for poor households
to make migration decisions they would not make otherwise.
15
In sum, the system of cash and near-cash transfers causes reductions in work effort (that
involve output losses that are valued by society more highly than the gains from the increased leisure),
causes reductions in private savings (with associated reductions in economic productivity and growth in
excess of the value of the increased consumption spending), and provides incentives for marital break-
up, out-of-wedlock births, and migration decisions that are likely to entail social costs in excess of the
benefits conveyed.  In addition to these effects, there are other distortions that have been created, such
as encouraging transfer recipients and taxpayers into activities outside of the regular economy, some of
which—drug trafficking or failing to report earned income—are illegal.
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Our most fundamental critique of the structure of the existing tax and transfer system concerns
the dysfunction between the basic purpose of the programs and society's current judgments regarding
the nature of the poverty problem.  At their core, existing tax and transfer programs seek to secure for
the market-income poor a level of after-tax (disposable) income that exceeds some minimum standard. 
This is accomplished by offering direct cash payments, by directly providing goods judged to be basic
essentials for living, and by insuring relief from fiscal burdens that other citizens face.
Yet when citizens today contemplate the poverty problem, they see something quite different
than the simple need for income assistance.  And the reasons for their perceptions are not difficult to
understand.  Over the thirty years since the current system was designed, U.S. society has witnessed
enormous changes in economic performance and individual behavior, and as a result expectations have
changed.  With the rapid growth in female labor force participation, we now expect that able-bodied
women with children should contribute to their own well-being through work.  Similarly, with the
growth in the coverage and generosity of Social Security benefits, we no longer view older people as a
particularly disadvantaged group.  And with the serious erosion in earnings opportunities for young and12
less-educated workers, concerns with employment and training needs for low-skilled workers have
replaced the focus on income support.  In short, the poor population of thirty years ago—that for which
the current system was designed—had a larger percentage of people who were regarded as "worthy"
and who were not expected to work than it does today.
These changes in the composition of the poor population and in our expectations of them have
created doubts regarding the wisdom of the income support approach.  These concerns have been
reinforced by what are perceived to be dysfunctional behaviors and choices of some of the poor.  While
these images may be colored by stereotypes and prejudice, it is clear that some of those in the bottom
tail of the distribution today are there because of choices they have made—the choice to bear children
out of wedlock as a teen, the choice not to complete high school, the decision to refuse minimum wage
employment when it is available, the decision to abuse drugs and sell them, the willingness to run in
gangs and to engage in crime and violence, often against other poor people.  And while economic and
social factors, urban schools, and the barriers created by racial prejudice may make these choices a
rational response to the options available, it is also true that these outcomes are socially costly and
destructive.  The prevalence of these behaviors among today's poor relative to the poor two or three
decades ago also tinges the nation's assessment of our current antipoverty strategy.
If this characterization is true, the questions so often asked today about the current tax and
transfer system become much more reasonable:  If transfer recipients are able to engage in work, why
don't we require it as a condition of providing cash and in-kind assistance?  If they are unable to break
into regular jobs because of a lack of training (or a lack of child or health care support), why don't we
make sure they get the training and the child and health care services while we give them cash?  If they
are having additional children that can be supported only by additional taxpayer assistance—or working
"off the books," or drug dealing while they should be learning, or opting not to marry in order to sustain
public payments and subsidies—why should we simply provide support without attempting to change13
the behavior?  Concerns like these are not addressed by the structure of the current income support
system.
IMPROVING TAX AND TRANSFER ANTIPOVERTY POLICIES:  ENCOURAGING
RESPONSIBILITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
For all of the reasons we have outlined, reform of the nation's current tax-transfer antipoverty
strategy is high on the nation's policy agenda.  Especially at the state level, policymakers are discussing
themes and programs like "Work, Not Welfare," "Ending Welfare as We Know it," "Learnfare,"
"Bridefare," "Workfare," "Time-Limits," and "Benefit Caps."  And while the changes that are proposed
are described as "reforms," and while some of them correct gaps and inefficient incentives in the
current system, many reflect a harsh posture toward the poor that has not found its way into policy
heretofore.  Widespread adoption of them would send policy down a quite different road than the nation
has followed until now.  
While much of the experimentation in antipoverty policy in recent years has occurred at the
state level (Wiseman, 1993), the Clinton administration has now taken center stage by proposing a
national reform of welfare and antipoverty policy.  Reports of their plans—both formal and
informal—suggest a far-reaching change in the direction of policy.
The Clinton Administration's Welfare Reform Plan:  A Critique
The primary provisions of the Clinton administration's welfare reform proposal reflect the
inadequacies of the current strategy, and directly respond to the general perception that our current tax
and transfer redistribution strategy is not structured to help the poor achieve economic independence.
The administration's proposal expresses four broad themes.  The first is to "make work pay."  
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Large steps have already been taken toward achieving this goal through the major expansion of the
earned income tax credit that was part of the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA93).  By14
1998 the program is projected to cost $24.5 billion, $7 billion of which is the result of the 1993
expansion.  For taxpayers with incomes in the lower earnings range of the credit, the expanded EITC
can be thought of as a well-targeted increase in the minimum wage, to $5.95 per hour for families with
two or more children ($5.70 for one-child taxpayers), from $4.25 an hour.  The expanded credit will
deliver benefits to more than six million working taxpayers with incomes below the poverty line, will
close the poverty gap by $6.4 billion, and will raise the incomes of over one million taxpayers to a level
above the poverty line (see Scholz [1994]).
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The second theme is that parenting implies responsibility.  Paternity will be established for
children, absent parents will be sought, and mandatory payments in support of their children will be
obtained through wage withholding.  Such "child support enforcement" is not a new proposal, as it was
a central part of the 1988 Family Support Act.  Consistent with this theme, extensive efforts designed to
reduce teen nonmarital childbearing—through moral suasion and grants for innovative prevention
programs—have been planned.
The third theme recognizes that education and training are necessary if poor people are to
become self-sufficient in today's economy.  Therefore, income support recipients will be
simultaneously assisted (indeed, required) to acquire training, education, and/or work experience; they
will experience "workfare."  In addition, support for child care will be expanded to facilitate
participation in mandatory training programs and to ease the transition from welfare to work.
The fourth theme is that the receipt of welfare benefits (as distinct from the EITC) cannot go on
indefinitely.  Those subject to this provision (the youngest one-third of the five million current
recipients—those born after 1972—and who are able to work) will be forced to operate in a world in
which income support is a temporary and transitional "help," a mechanism designed to enable people to
get their lives in sufficient order to live independently, relying on the returns from their own efforts. 
This is "time limited welfare"; it is often popularized as "two years and out."  When the time limit for15
support has been reached, recipients will be turned out to find their own way in the world of work,
assisted by child care subsidies and, of course, health coverage as a part of the president's health care
reform proposal; if they are unable to find work, the government will guarantee them a low-paying
public service job (or subsidize the private sector for providing jobs).
How do these elements of the Clinton proposal fare, given our critique of current policy? 
While each analyst may have his or her own assessment of the plan, we offer the following.  Expansion
of the EITC as part of the first theme is an extremely important, effective policy; it increases the return
to work for taxpayers with children and does so in a coherent manner within the structure of the
personal income tax.   Further changes to improve the advance payment option so that families can
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secure work-related income support throughout the year rather than at tax-filing time, and to lower
incentives for noncompliance, would improve an already good initiative (see Yin, Scholz, Forman, and
Mazur [forthcoming] for a discussion of these issues).  
The next theme, increasing efforts to collect and assure child support and to routinize the
collection system, are to be commended.  Nevertheless, those who have studied this possibility and who
are its biggest advocates suggest that no more than a marginal increment in available income support
will accrue to most mothers now on welfare (Meyer, 1993; Meyer, Garfinkel, Oellerich, and Robins,
1992).  The initiatives designed to heighten awareness of the costs of teen nonmarital childbearing are
too vague and untested to enable a judgment one way or the other.
The third and fourth themes—involving time-limited welfare, training and education through
workfare, child and health care assistance, and a guaranteed public service job—are, in our view,
dangerous territory.  While changing the rules and benefit structure of welfare programs to minimize
the rewards available for dysfunctional behavior is one thing, the threat to cancel income support is
quite another.  Most current recipients lack the basic skills to work themselves out of poverty on their
own, even if they were to work full-time, full-year at the wage rate that their education, experience, and16
health characteristics would command (Haveman and Buron, 1993; Burtless, 1994).  And it is but a
dream that the sort of training and remedial education that will be offered through "workfare" will
make these people job-ready and economically independent.  Indeed, only the most successful of the
intensive training programs targeted at welfare recipients have secured earnings increases of as much as
$1000 per year two years after the end of the program.  While these programs may pass a benefit-cost
test, they do not convey the sort of gains in wages necessary to escape poverty (Gueron and Pauly,
1991).  Moreover, the total costs of operating a reasonable public service jobs program are sufficiently
high—in the neighborhood of $15,000 per worker per year —that current budgetary constraints insure
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that the supply of slots would be far exceeded by the demand.
The limited funds available for welfare reform must cover additional training, education, child
care, and public service employment.  The monies available for the last of these—public service
employment jobs—will determine how many job slots are available.  The number of slots available,
together with some estimate of the number of recipients encountering the two year limit and who will
not be able to secure private sector jobs, will determine the number of recipients who will be made
subject to the two year and out provision.  And, this number will ultimately drive the level of
exemptions that are ultimately granted.
A policy of time-limited welfare, combined with child care, education, and job guarantee
measures, could run the gamut from being harsh and punitive to being merely rhetorical or, in the best
of circumstances, it could offer an effective route to independence and self-sufficiency.  The policy's
success will depend both on how time limits are implemented, and especially on the funds that are
available and how those funds are allocated.
If a rigid time-limited welfare program is actually put in place and enforced, the nation would
be engaging in social measures that are more harsh than any that currently exist in western
industrialized countries, and more harsh than we have ever before been willing to accept.  And while17
one might acknowledge the need for harsh treatment for some adults who have made welfare
recipiency a career, the hardships imposed on them fall also on the children for whom they care.  In our
view, the imposition and enforcement of a rigid time limit on welfare receipt would, by itself, be an
overly simplistic answer to a problem whose solution requires extensive social service support for
dysfunctional families, an overhaul of schools that are not educating poor children, community-based
services to combat gangs and violence, and housing initiatives that ensure the poor are given the
opportunity to live in clean and safe housing.  Because the Clinton initiative precludes additional
expenditures, time limits become a potentially dangerous and mean-spirited approach to the poverty
problem.
If time-limits are enacted together with a wide variety of exemptions and opportunities for
delaying or avoiding their enforcement—for example, exemptions for women with small children, or
those who cannot locate adequate child care, or for whom no private or public job seems available, or
those who are long-term recipients with few job skills—this aspect of the program could be merely
rhetorical.  The long history of enacting, but failing to impose, work requirements in welfare programs
makes this a real possibility, especially in the absence of funding to support the education, training, and
job guarantee measures.
Indeed, the promise of time-limited recipiency can be realized only if the training, employment,
and child care support on which terminated recipients will depend provides the means for attaining
independence and self-sufficiency.  The effectiveness of the measures depends on the structure of and
the financial support for these work-enabling programs.
Some Alternative Proposals:  Strengthening the Low-Wage Labor Market
21
The Clinton proposals get high marks for increasing the value of work through the expansion of
the EITC and for realigning aspects of antipoverty programs with society's current judgments regarding
the nature of the poverty problem.  However, the plan fails to address the damper that the nation's18
private sector labor market places on the opportunity for self-sufficiency of the nation's low-skilled,
low-educated workers.  In particular, the Clinton program presumes that there is either strong excess
demand for low-skilled labor, or a very high wage elasticity of demand.  Neither presumption seems
warranted.  In addition, the reforms fail to help low-skilled individuals and couples without children;
their exclusion is horizontally inequitable and reduces the antipoverty effectiveness of the measures.  
In our view, unless the operation of the bottom end of the labor market is changed or
supplemented, no plan designed to substitute work for public income support can be effective in
achieving economic independence for the nation's large and growing pool of low-wage, low-skilled
workers.  While the expanded EITC moves in the right direction, we offer a few additional suggestions
aimed at increasing the flexibility and performance of the low-wage end of the labor market by
offsetting a variety of constraints and rigidities with which it is now burdened.
The labor market problem that confronts disadvantaged workers is primarily a structural
employment problem; joblessness for certain groups exists in spite of near full employment in the rest
of the economy (Haveman and Buron, 1994).  The most basic reason for this is the inherent lack of
skills and education possessed by millions of low-wage, often inexperienced, potential workers.  Hiring
them often fails to generate additional profit for employers.  This is compounded by the distortionary
effects of the combination of minimum wage laws, union wage contracts, and the fringe benefits and
payroll taxes that businesses are required to pay for every worker.  These constraints contribute to the
labor market disadvantage of the low-skilled.
A policy initiative to address this problem could be modeled on a modest effort that was in
effect in 1977–78, known as the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC).  The NJTC provided a tax credit equal
to 50 percent of the first $6,000 of wages paid to the fifty workers hired in a firm above 102 percent of
the previous year's employment level.   Because the subsidy ($3,000) was a higher percentage of total
22
wages for less-skilled workers than for those with more education or experience, the incentive for19
private employers to bend hiring decisions toward them was substantial.   Although the NJTC was
23
never enthusiastically embraced by the Treasury Department (which administered it but never
publicized it), research evaluations indicate that it was successful in creating jobs for low-skilled
workers, and at a rather low cost to the Treasury—up to 30 percent of the 1977–78 employment growth
in the studied industries was attributable to the program (Bishop and Haveman, 1979; Perloff and
Wachter, 1979).
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In reinstating the NJTC, the new program should be made permanent, so that low-skilled labor
is not merely "on sale" for a temporary period.  The government should enthusiastically support the
plan, publicize it widely, and work with the business community to minimize misunderstandings and
bureaucratic difficulties.  The earlier program parameters could be modified so as to increase the hiring
incentive by increasing the amount of subsidy that is paid on the wage base.  In addition, the cap on the
subsidy available to any single firm could be removed so that the marginal employment decisions of
large firms are subsidized to the same extent as those of small firms.  Finally, the wage basis on which
the subsidy is paid could be changed so as to increase the marginal incentive for hiring low-wage
workers. 
If additional steps were needed to employ low-income workers, the employer-based NJTC
could be supplemented by an employee-based subsidy program that would complement the expanded
EITC by directly "making work pay."  In this plan, a target wage rate (say, $10 per hour) would be set,
and any worker taking a job at less than this level (say, $6) would be subsidized at, say, 50 percent of
the difference between the actual wage of $6 and the $10 target wage.  In this example, the take-home
wage would be $8—the $6 wage plus the $2 subsidy.  The effect of the subsidy would be to give a low-
wage worker a labor market advantage, and hence an incentive to seek work; it is a program oriented to
the supply side of the labor market for low-skilled workers.   At the same time, employers—given the
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NJTC—would have an incentive to seek out low-skilled workers and to favor them in hiring decisions.20
In this program, as opposed to other employee-based subsidy programs, firms would not have
to significantly alter their personnel practices, and particular categories of workers would not need to be
identified and targeted for assistance.  As in all proposals designed to change the operation of markets,
however, concerns would arise.  One oft-raised issue involves the possibility of employer-employee
collusion, where employers would declare a lower wage rate than in fact is true, secure the subsidy, and
then share the falsely generated subsidy with the employee.  The overall effect of the supply response
to the subsidy on the overall level of the market wage for low-skilled workers would also have to be
assessed.  Finally, the integration of the wage rate subsidy and the EITC would have to be considered,
though the straightforward solution would be to count the EITC subsidy as realized earnings.  The
effect of these two programs would create a formidable "make work pay" combination and blunt the
disincentive created by the claw-back portion of the EITC (see endnote 18).
The combination of this pair of employment incentives would improve the operation of the
low-skilled labor market by generating ongoing demand and supply-side pressure for the creation of
jobs for marginal workers at reasonable cost.  As such, it would equalize employment opportunities. 
By targeting the additional employment on underutilized segments of the labor market, national income
could be increased without significant inflationary pressure.  The combination will fundamentally alter
the wage structure in private labor markets, raising the take-home pay of low-skilled workers relative to
those with more secure positions in the labor market.  The cost of an employment subsidy arrangement
such as this would be substantially lower than providing equivalent jobs through public service
employment, which is one possibility that has been considered by the Clinton administration.
Some Alternative Proposals:  Capital Accounts for Young People and Poor Families
A general concern with existing tax and transfer policy as it applies to the low-income
population is that it forces individuals to spend or never accumulate assets to secure income support,
and then eliminates the possibility of accumulating assets—even limited amounts of them—in order to21
retain benefits.   These provisions erode still further the hopes and aspirations of those with few of
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these to begin with, and thereby stifle drive and initiative.  
Recent proposals for encouraging savings—or, indeed, assigning assets—would address this
problem.  Haveman (1988), for example, suggests establishing a universal capital account of, say,
$20,000 that would be assigned to all youths at age eighteen who have graduated high school, which
could be used to support human capital investments of their choice.  Youths possessing such an account
will have the incentive to shop for and choose the activity they judge will best serve their needs.   They
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could draw on this account at any time for purchases of education and medical care services from
approved programs, as well as for some related living expenses, and an annual statement of the value of
the account would be sent to each youth.  Such an account, constrained by standards established for
screening and approving proposed education and health care expenditures, increases the range of
choices available to poor youths.  It grants individuals the dignity of more freely planning their own
lives, rather than being induced into certain activities through the incentives of existing institutionally
based and paternalistic subsidy schemes.
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A less far-reaching variant also envisions the establishment of capital accounts for low-income
families.  Contributions to these accounts would be supplemented at some rate by matching
contributions by the government.   The accumulated sums in these accounts could, after some period,
29
be drawn upon for approved purposes that might involve the purchase of a home, the starting up of a
small enterprise, or the support of education for a child.  As with the capital account for youths, the
objective is to create a stake in the future for those who now have little stake, and to enable them to use
their resources for purposes that will enable independence and self-sufficiency.
CONCLUSIONS22
The inherent tension among the primary goals of antipoverty tax and transfer policy—providing
a generous or humane level of benefits, having benefits that are well targeted, and maintaining
desirable economic incentives (particularly low marginal tax rates)—makes it clear why welfare is so
hard to reform.  However, even if welfare is reformed, the problem of poverty goes well beyond these
concerns.  Any plan that simply improves the nation's tax-transfer system would leave untouched the
problems of elementary and secondary education, crime, violence, and family disintegration that
characterize poor communities, particularly those in our large cities.
There are positive attributes to the Clinton administration's welfare reform proposal.  The
expanded EITC makes work a more attractive option for millions of low-wage workers with children. 
Education and training may improve the labor market prospects of some workers, and the "tough love"
components of the proposal may discourage unwanted behavior.  At the same time, the proposal
embarks on untested territory with the potential for treatment of disadvantaged people that many view
as short-sighted and punitive.  Even more important, the Clinton proposals are not likely to reduce
poverty in America, primarily because of the constrained budgetary resources that have been allocated
to them.  While welfare as we know it may end, poverty as we know it will not.
Our proposals, designed to strengthen demand for low-income workers and to provide an
opportunity for low-income workers to accumulate resources, are also not a panacea.  It is difficult to
efficiently alter markets to benefit low-income households, and it is costly to establish "capital
accounts" for poor teenagers or subsidize the savings of low-income households.  Nevertheless, labor
market opportunities are bleak for youths and adults with low levels of education, and asset tests stifle
opportunity.  While our suggestions address these problems, they imply a quite different reform
strategy than that which the Clinton administration has set before us.2324
      In addition, there are a number of other proposed initiatives, including efforts to reduce teen
1
nonmarital births and to better integrate AFDC and food stamp benefits.
      The poverty line is defined by the Census Bureau as a fixed real income that is sufficient to provide
2
a minimally adequate standard of living (the poverty line for selected years and family types is given in
Table 3).  The Census money-income concept, which includes AFDC and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), but not the earned income tax credit (EITC) or in-kind transfers in the form of Medicaid,
food stamps, and housing benefits, is typically used to assess poverty.  The Census Bureau also
publishes information on the size of the poverty population since 1979 using alternative definitions of
income.  In 1991, for example, 35.7 million persons were in poverty using the common Census money-
income definition of poverty.  If the income concept is broadened to include noncash transfers, taxes,
and the net imputed return on equity in own home, the number falls by 27.9 percent, to 25.8 million
people (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993a).
      U.S. Bureau of the Census (1993b), Table 735, and U.S. Congress, House of Representatives
3
(1993), p. 1313.
      Historically, AFDC has been directed at single-parent households with children, though in recent
4
years the program has served two-parent families in which one of the parents is unemployed.
      The food stamp program was implemented for the first time on a uniform national basis in fiscal
5
year 1975, though uniform national standards for the program were established in 1972.
      If the official definition of poverty given in Table 1 is used, cash transfers removed from poverty
6
about 19 million pretax and pretransfer poor in 1991.  These calculations ignore all behavioral
responses to the benefit programs.
      The poverty gap measures the amount of income that would need to be transferred to the poor to lift
7
every household's income to the poverty line (again, assuming there are no behavioral responses to the
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transfers). 
      These estimates include the effects of in-kind transfers and tax provisions excluded from the
8
definition of official poverty (Table 1).  Using the official poverty definition, the comparable figures
would be 39 percent in 1979 and 34 percent in 1990.  
      As shown in Table 2, the income decline for women with different levels of educational attainment
9
has not been nearly as dramatic.  The figures in Table 2 are also consistent with Blank (1994, Table 2),
who shows that average weekly earnings for nonelderly adult men with less than a high school degree
fell 18.3 percent between 1969 and 1989, while the wages for women with the same educational
attainment were constant over the period.  Over this period, women's labor force participation increased
sharply.
      The AFDC recipient can still deduct $30 for eight more months.
10
      The interaction of AFDC and food stamp implicit marginal tax rates is complicated.  A person
11
receiving benefits from both programs and who has earned income exceeding the AFDC disregards
would face a 66  percent marginal tax rate on AFDC.  From the perspective of the food stamp
program, earned income increases by 80 cents for every dollar of earnings (there is a 20 percent
disregard for earnings), but unearned income would have fallen by 66  cents for every dollar of
earnings (the reduction in AFDC benefits).  The net of these amounts, 13 , is the increase in food
stamp "countable income" for every dollar of earnings, and is taxed at a 30 percent rate, which implies
an additional 4 percent marginal tax rate.  Thus, the marginal tax rate on earnings in the first four
months of working is 70 ; after four months it is 94 percent.
      Browning and Johnson (1984), Ballard (1988), and Triest (1993) examine the effects of expanding
12
the tax and transfer system to transfer more from the rich to the poor.  Considering labor supply effects
and deadweight losses, Browning and Johnson concluded that upper-income groups bearing the costs of
taxes would sacrifice $350 for every $100 that the poor gained.  Subsequent work has strongly26
contested the Browning and Johnson estimates.  Ballard, in a well-specified numerical general
equilibrium model, calculates that when taxes are raised on only those in the highest portion of the
income distribution and transfers are received by only those in the bottom, it would cost $114 to
transfer $100.  Triest estimates the efficiency costs of expanding a program like the EITC, and finds
that the cost of redistributing $100 would range from $116 to $144 under his central parameter
estimates.
      For example, a family receiving food stamps cannot have financial assets exceeding $2,000
13
($3,000 if the family unit has a member older than fifty-nine), and cannot own assets and a car whose
combined market value exceeds $6,500.  A family receiving AFDC cannot have more than $1,000 of
financial assets.  In a well-publicized case, Cecelia Mercado was ordered by the Connecticut Supreme
Court to repay $9,342.75 in AFDC payments because her daughter, without her knowledge, had taken a
part-time job and, in a year and a half, had saved almost $5,000 toward attending college.  To become
recertified to receive AFDC, the daughter and her brother (who had saved nearly $1,000) had to spend
their savings until the household's assets fell below the $1,000 asset limit (William Raspberry, Atlanta
Journal and Constitution, 8/21/92, p. A10).
      Beginning in 1994, the EITC for the first time included a small (maximum of $306) credit for
14
childless taxpayers.
      Walker (1994), however, finds little empirical evidence that welfare benefits have a significant
15
effect on the location decisions of low-income households.
      Moffitt (1992) surveys evidence on many of these topics.  Also see Jencks and Edin (1990) for a
16
fascinating study of the income sources and expenditures of a small group of AFDC recipients.
      This phrase was popularized by Ellwood (1988), who used it to refer to a set of policies that he
17
argued would make work more attractive than welfare.   
      Except for the EITC, the federal tax system plays a relatively minor role in antipoverty policy. 
1827
Because the income tax is uniform across the nation, relying more heavily on the EITC within the
income tax would reduce one important source of horizontal inequity.  As currently configured,
however, the EITC is not available to working poor individuals and couples without children (except
for the modest childless taxpayer credit).  Yet, there are problems with relying more heavily on the tax
system to fight poverty.  Many poor persons, particularly those without earnings, do not file returns.  In
addition, it seems unlikely that the Internal Revenue Service is equipped to do the sort of outreach
necessary to raise participation rates to acceptable levels, particularly toward those families with a
weak attachment to the labor market.  Moreover, the fact that fewer than .5 percent of EITC recipients
receive payments as an incremental benefit throughout the year (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1992) raises the question of whether the IRS could successfully administer a system that requires
periodic payments.  Finally, given the extensive number of other in-kind and cash support programs,
the IRS would necessarily become more involved with other government agencies in a variety of
complex program integration issues.  
      For taxpayers with two or more children and income in the phaseout range of the credit (which
19
starts at $11,000 in 1994 dollars), the EITC will claw back benefits at the rate of 21.06 cents for every
dollar of earnings (the rate is 15.98 for taxpayers with one child) after it is fully phased in in 1996. 
While estimates vary widely, it is clear that these tax rates will reduce, to some degree, the labor supply
of taxpayers in the phaseout range of the credit.
      Haveman (1980) cites a 1979 estimate of $9,000 per job per year, which in current dollars exceeds
20
$15,000.
      A more extensive discussion of the policies discussed in this section is given in Haveman (1988).
21
      Presumably the threshold for incremental hiring could be set at a level that reflects the
22
macroeconomic performance of the country or region, rather than using the 102 percent criterion.
      The NJTC differs in important respects from the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), which the
2328
Clinton administration proposes to eliminate.  The TJTC focuses on individual workers, who must be
certified by the state employment office that they are a member of a disadvantaged group.  If an
employer hires a certified worker, the employer must complete a lot of paperwork to receive a subsidy. 
Hence, employer participation has been low.  Certification of workers has appeared, in some instances,
to stigmatize workers, making it harder for them to secure employment.  
      Bishop and Haveman (1979) found that the NJTC would be paid on nearly 1 percent of the U.S.
24
labor force at a cost of roughly $2 billion.  The evaluations of the program did not provide estimates of
program costs per job created.
      The wage subsidy would tend to reduce the market wage rate of low-skilled workers by
25
encouraging an increase in their labor supply.  If this occurred, part of the benefit of the subsidy would
accrue to employers.  However, the minimum wage will lessen the erosion of market wages for the
affected workers.
      Of course, there may be noncompliance with the statutory asset tests.  We cannot assess the
26
importance of noncompliance with asset tests, and we are not aware of any work that does. 
      Hoff and Lyon (1994) discuss situations where targeted grants to low-wealth groups can increase
27
overall economic efficiency by reducing agency costs that inhibit acquisition of human capital.
      Haveman (1988) estimates that the net budgetary cost of the individual capital account would be
28
about $10 to $15 billion in the first years of the plan, rising to around $20 to $25 billion after a period of
five to ten years. 
      The government subsidizes contributions to IRA, 401(k), and Keogh plans for higher-income
29
taxpayers by allowing contributions to be deducted from taxable income and by allowing interest to
accumulate in the accounts tax free.  These subsidies are not worthwhile for families with incomes
below the poverty line because they generally have a marginal tax rate of zero.  Individual capital
accounts would broaden access to subsidized savings.  Sherraden (1991) discusses saving-incentive29
schemes for low-income households.  The administration's plan does incorporate increased
opportunities for welfare recipients to accumulate limited savings for specific purposes, blunting the
adverse effects of existing asset tests.30
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